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In any report on conflict today refugees are invariably presented to us as being “traumatised,” 
“psychologically scarred,” “indelibly marked,” “emotionally damaged,” “hopeless,” or 
“overwhelmed by grief.” Such is the preoccupation with trauma that over the last decade 
trauma victims have even displaced famine victims in the Western public‟s imagination. The 
emotional state of refugees has become a prominent issue in humanitarian work. What is 
known as psychosocial intervention is now a standard response to conflict and disaster 
situations. Kosovo was no exception. Counselling programmes were a core aspect of the 
humanitarian response there. The British Red Cross, International Committee of the Red 
Cross, CAFOD, CARE, Children‟s Aid Direct, Concern, MSF, Oxfam, Save the Children, 
Tearfund, UNICEF are just a few of the scores of agencies which have been involved in 
psychosocial work.  
 
The therapeutic paradigm is presumed to be pertinent to the concerns of all societies. Indeed 
so steeped is the West in a post-traumatic culture
2
 that its therapeutic understanding is even 
being projected onto animals. The emotional state of animals has not been overlooked either 
in the media or by aid agencies.
3
 The British agency SPANA‟s Kosovo Animals‟ Appeal 
declared how its veterinary experts entered Kosovo “to bring crucial help to war-traumatised 
animals.”4 Presumably group counselling was not being provided for the local cattle or sheep. 
Nevertheless the appeal indicates how problems are viewed through therapeutic spectacles in 
the West. 
 Through a case study of international responses in Kosovo, this article critically analyses how 
the international therapeutic model constructs war-affected populations as traumatised and 
subject to psychosocial dysfunctionalism. The international therapeutic model may be 
summarised as follows: traumatic experiences cause trauma symptoms producing low self 
esteem and dysfunctionalism leading to abuse/violence, requiring external intervention to 
break the cycle of trauma and violence. The first half of the paper contends the international 
projection of the population as traumatised. The second half of the paper examines 
psychosocial intervention as a new mode of external therapeutic governance.
5
 The paper 
suggests that concern for war trauma in international policy does not necessarily represent a 
positive development for war-affected populations. International psychosocial intervention 
has been criticised as a form of cultural imperialism, that is, the imposition of a Western 
therapeutic model on other societies, which have their own coping strategies. The psychiatrist 
Derek Summerfield, formerly of the Medical Foundation for Victims of Torture, has forcibly 
warned that Western psychological concepts and methodologies risk “an unwitting 
perpetuation of the colonial status of the non-Western-mind.”6 There is a danger of the cycle 
of trauma and violence thesis echoing Western colonial and racist psychology of fifty years 
ago. The idea that war renders whole populations traumatised and dysfunctional 
problematises their capacity for self-government. The construction of populations as 
traumatised is leading to their disqualification from self-government and the legitimisation of 
indefinite international administration. 
 
Projecting trauma and professionalising adversity  
 
What is immediately striking examining aid agency reports is the prevalence of the idea that 
war-affected populations will be traumatised and suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD). Even if agencies acknowledge that different cultures and beliefs may respond 
differently to adversity, there is nevertheless an assumption that refugees in a war must be 
traumatised. International agencies reiterated this assumption in the Kosovo crisis, and more 
recently in Afghanistan.  Psychosocial work has been a core aspect of the international 
humanitarian responses in both cases.  
 
Disregarded in the international psychosocial model imposed on Kosovo and elsewhere is the 
specificity of the concept of PTSD and its origins in the medicalisation of the US experience 
of defeat in the Vietnam War.
7
 Historically individuals and societies have responded to war 
in different ways, as is evident in the vivid documentation of the experience of war in Joanna 
Bourke‟s An Intimate History of Killing (2000) or Benjamin Shephard‟s War of Nerves: 
Soldiers and Psychiatrists 1914-1994 (2000).
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 Detailed analysis suggests that the appearance 
of a traumatic condition in war is specific, not universal. There are particular personal, 
political, social and cultural factors, as well as military circumstances, which mediate war 
experiences and influence whether an individual does or does not become traumatised. 
However, current international psychosocial policy is based on the idea that post-traumatic 
stress is universal and intervention is universally required, albeit with cultural modifications. 
 
Automatically constructing refugees as traumatised, the international psychosocial model 
fails to make a proper distinction between the experience of distressing events and the 
appearance of a post-traumatic stress disorder. The very invocation of a state of war in 
Kosovo in Spring 1999 appears to have been sufficient to identify the population as 
psychologically traumatised. The link has become a truism. Diagnosis is rendered irrelevant, 
when as Summerfield has noted, “diagnosis can be made in the absence of significant 
objective dysfunction”.9 Statements such as “People are traumatised”10 abound in agency 
appeals, brochures and field reports.  
 
Symptoms such as hyper-alertness, sleeplessness, anxiety or expressions of hopelessness or 
depressive behaviour are not properly presented as normal psychological reactions to 
abnormal and acute circumstances. Yet as Sigmund Freud observed nearly eighty years, “on 
occasions when the most extreme forms of suffering have to be endured special protective 
devices come into operation.”11 Even where a distinction between the body‟s ordinary 
defence mechanisms and pathological conditions is recognised, the differentiation is more 
apparent than real. For example, Coping with Disaster: A Guidebook to Psychosocial 
Intervention prepared for Mental Health Workers without Borders used in Kosovo and other 
emergencies advises: 
 
The prevalence of strong physiological, cognitive, and emotional responses to 
disasters indicates that these are normal responses to an extreme situation, not a 
sign of “mental illness” or of “moral weakness.” Nevertheless, the symptoms 
experienced by many victims in the days and weeks following a disaster are a 
source of significant distress and may interfere with their ability to reconstruct 
their lives. If not dealt with and resolved relatively quickly, they may become 
ongoing sources of distress and dysfunction, with devastating effects for the 
individual, their family and society.
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In other words, while the guide distinguishes the typical heightened responses exhibited in 
extreme situations from mental illness, these (often adaptive) reactions too are pathologised 
as requiring treatment. Here individuals and communities displaying the characteristic 
defence responses are deemed to be at risk and unable to recover without professional 
intervention. Consequently, mass psychosocial programmes are viewed as imperative by aid 
agencies. In their absence, it is feared that people will develop chronic conditions.
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However, symptoms of stress do not necessarily interfere “with their ability to reconstruct 
their lives.” Stress can serve as a stimulus to activity, thereby facilitating processes of 
reconstruction. Moreover, the current approach neglects how stressors may have positive 
effects on individuals.
14
  
 
The efficacy of the international psychosocial model is not validated or remains inconclusive 
in authoritative studies, despite its vigorous promotion.
15
 The current dearth of evidence for 
the efficacy of trauma counselling is acknowledged by adherents, but rather as an 
afterthought. For example, after over a hundred pages outlining different counselling 
approaches, a leading textbook Counselling for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder concedes that 
research does not yet endorse practice.
16
 Not taken on board in international psychosocial 
policy are studies suggesting that debriefing may actually be detrimental to recovery.
17
 When 
all the psychological terms are stripped away, we appear to be left with individuals or 
communities‟ own responses being displaced or instrumentalised by outside professionals, 
informed by presumptions of the disablement of recipient populations.  
 
Yet is the professionalisation of distress beneficial? Professor Simon Wessely of Professor of 
Epidemiological and Liaison Psychiatry at Kings University argues that actively 
professionalising distress, as therapeutic intervention inevitably does, thereby impedes 
“normal processes by which we assimilate adversity.”18 The very intrusion into the personal 
sphere may inadvertently corrode the sense of intimacy necessary for cohesive family and 
community bonds, which are so important in mediating and overcoming trauma. Since stress 
and anger can be a spur to action, psychosocial intervention may dis-empower people in the 
long-term.
19
 Likewise, intervention to alleviate anxiety in an insecure situation where anxiety 
is a rational response challenges individuals‟ trust of their own instincts, potentially making 
them feel more insecure. 
 
Aid agencies are sensitive to charges that psychosocial programmes might dis-empower or 
stigmatise recipients. For example, the guidelines of the Emergency Management Group 
coordinating aid distribution in Albania state how, “We prefer to talk of „special needs 
groups‟ instead of „vulnerable‟ as the latter expression tends to be stigmatising.”20 Aid 
workers sometimes speak of survivors in an attempt not to stereotype people as passive 
victims. Nevertheless, however sensitive the language used, the psychosocial model does 
project people as incapacitated through their trauma and indefinitely dependent on external 
actors for their psychological survival. Local professionals too are projected as unable to help 
their community without outside assistance. For example, one popular manual on earlier 
psychosocial projects in Bosnia advises, “The professional helpers, social workers, health 
staff, teachers face such huge problems in the traumatized population that they may become 
helpless and overwhelmed.”21 Yet, for all the agency assumptions about the vulnerability of 
populations, international aid workers seem less resilient in the face of their vicarious trauma 
than locals are. Research suggests that PTSD is a serious problem among international relief 
and development personnel - one recent survey documenting approximately 30 per cent of 
those surveyed as reporting significant symptoms of PTSD.
22
 Guidelines on psychosocial 
work now commonly warn of the dangers of secondary or tertiary trauma and the danger of 
breakdown among counsellors themselves.
23
 Ironically, international aid workers in the 
Kosovo crisis have been more vulnerable to stress than their relatively resilient recipients. 
 
In essence, the international psychosocial model denies the resilience of survivors. So 
although the language of survival is increasingly being adopted by aid agencies (but not 
necessarily the media), survival is not equated with recovery, but with vulnerability. The idea 
of people being scarred for life is common. Describing Kosovo refugees, UNICEF Executive 
Director Carol Bellamy speaks of “the devastating, lasting psychological shock of what 
they‟ve experienced.”24 Even where refugees appear to be coping well, it is warned that, 
“PTSD symptoms may emerge years after the trauma.”25 Likewise another UNICEF report 
claims, “time does not heal trauma.”26 As these reports indicate the dominant Western 
therapeutic paradigm informing international psychosocial intervention regards people as 
being “in recovery”, “in remission,” never recovered. Recovery is viewed as illusory. 
Survivors are projected as being permanently vulnerable and in need of external help. The 
effect is to deny their capacity to run their own lives and societies. There can be no exit 
strategy when people are merely “in recovery.”  
 
In this internationalisation and professionalisation of adversity, indigenous coping strategies 
are thus not merely demeaned and dis-empowered. The community itself is pathologised as 
dysfunctional and politically delegitimised. The therapeutic paradigm implies an indefinite 
international presence to administer to a traumatised population. Moreover, an international 
protectorate whose remit encompasses the supervision of the psychological state of the 
population entails a far more extensive and intrusive foreign presence than past colonial 
administrations. 
 
Mass trauma? 
 
International programmes promote the belief that refugees are traumatised and that external 
psychosocial intervention is essential. However, more detailed evaluations contradict the 
assumptions of the international psychosocial model, emphasising the importance of 
distinguishing between traumatic experiences and the instance of trauma. As an IRC 
psychosocial needs assessment team in Kosovo reiterates, “Although many people in Kosovo 
have had traumatic experiences, the complexity and diversity of the situation mitigate [sic] 
against describing the general state of mind as „mass trauma‟.”27 There are often 
discrepancies between the assumptions of the psychosocial model and agencies‟ actual 
assessment of need. So although the Oxfam report quoted above blithely states that “people 
are traumatised”,28 an Oxfam health needs assessor Carole Collins observes how the family 
and community have been providing mutual support: 
 
It is unsurprising that the whole population appears dazed and traumatised. 
However the strong social networks i.e. large extended families and community 
networks appear strong and are providing support to more vulnerable 
individuals.
29
 
 
In its survey of psychosocial needs, the IRC assessment team in Kosovo also remarks that:  
 
while traumatic reaction, sadness, and depression are present, and while a 
significant number of children and adults experience difficulties such as sleep 
problems and social isolation, the people of Kosovo appear generally strong and 
resilient.
30
 
 
The report concludes that the mental health of the population is fine in general and that 
people are coping well emotionally. A detailed independent evaluation found in practice, 
“referral on for more specialised psychological help was extremely low” – at most two or 
three people “in each area and for each agency interviewed” -  in sharp contrast to the high 
levels of „traumatisation‟ claimed by agencies. 31 Moreover, concern has been expressed by 
field officers that the mass trauma programmes ignored and distracted from the needs of the 
existing seriously mentally ill and disabled - “summarily released from hospitals” due to 
wartime expediencies.
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 A recent report by Mental Disability Rights International (MDRI) on 
people with mental disabilities in Kosovo documents the appalling conditions still 
experienced by those in institutions and the lack of community services available to them.
33
 
The plight of the seriously mentally ill and disabled has been neglected in the face of an 
international community pathologising the emotional state of the population overall. The 
MDRI reports that, “The great majority of individuals with mental disabilities – 
approximately 40,000 such individuals – live with their families or on their own and receive 
no support from the government.”34 So while there have been plenty of resources going into 
the fashionable mass trauma counselling programmes, basic provision for those with long-
term mental illnesses or disabilities have been largely overlooked. Moreover some 
international trauma funding was specified as excluding those with mental disorders.
35
    
 
Distressful experiences do not necessary translate into post-traumatic disorders. Even where 
individuals have been hit by tragedy, their ability to deal with their grief has been remarkable. 
The IRC assessors note how, “Many Kosovars experience their suffering as an honor and 
display it as a badge of ethnic pride”, going as far as identifying a mood of “elation” among 
the Kosovo Albanian communities.
36
 This demonstrates the importance of politics in the 
mediation of the experience of trauma. However, international psychosocial policy continues 
to assume that PTSD is the norm among those who have experienced conflict. But why 
would victorious Kosovo Albanians (the main targets of psychosocial programmes) respond 
to war in the same way as defeated and demoralised US Vietnam veterans, shunned as 
pariahs on their return? In face of this communal strength, it is not surprising that the Kosovo 
Albanian population does not spontaneously list psychosocial support as necessary. Likewise, 
the highly politicised circumstances mean that Serbs and other non-Albanian ethnic groups 
do not regard psychosocial support as addressing their primarily political, security and 
economic concerns. 
 
Nevertheless, all the agencies have foregrounded psychological damage in their literature. In 
contrast to the emphasis put on psychological suffering, physical injuries appear far lower 
down the list of issues being flagged up by agencies. For example, physical injuries come 
under sections on “mine awareness training.” Typically today when you read about the 
humanitarian response to physical injuries it is often in the context of helping people “to 
come to terms with their injuries” – that is, programmes highlight how they are dealing with 
the psychological aspect of their physical injury as opposed to the injury itself. While special 
reports on psychosocial programmes are common, it is unusual to come across reports 
devoted to the agency‟s response to physical injuries. Discussion of provision for physical 
injuries tends to be squeezed into the psychosocial reports. For example, one survey on Child 
Mental Health and Psychosocial Services in Kosovo reports “a lack of prosthetic equipment 
and services” and how “many children are being sent abroad for the rehabilitation.”37 Without 
further comment, the survey then immediately informs us that “UNICEF has been providing 
psychosocial support to children and their families injured by landmines/UXO.”38 
 
Despite the contrary assessments, it is common for international aid agencies to make claims 
on the lines that “almost everyone in Kosovo will consider her- or himself traumatized.”39 
Yet the mental health model has not been immediately embraced by the population. It is 
striking how Kosovo refugees themselves have been far less likely to identify themselves or 
their family members as traumatised. This lack of identification is largely due to different 
cultural understandings of trauma. In contemporary Anglo-American culture, trauma 
confirms suffering and confers moral status and the basis for legal rights so there is a 
readiness for individuals to identity themselves as traumatised.
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 Indeed asylum claims in the 
West are augmented if refugees are diagnosed as having PTSD. Lawyers now regularly cite 
how their clients have been traumatised to enhance their case. It is in this context that PTSD 
has become an attractive diagnosis.
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 The different context is one important factor, which 
helps explain the discrepancies between the reporting of trauma in Kosovo as compared with 
Kosovo refugees abroad in the West. Kosovo Albanians have reported significantly higher 
PTSD responses in the United States (60.5 per cent)
42
 than in Kosovo (17.1 per cent).
43
 
Likewise in other societies such as Russia where trauma does not confer the same status, 
individuals do not like to identify themselves as traumatised and individuals tend to exhibit 
stoicism.
44
  
 
Generally, international staff in Kosovo and elsewhere have been far more ready to identify 
themselves as traumatised and seek trauma counselling than the locals themselves, despite the 
latter being exposed to greater danger. Trauma counselling centres have often been eschewed 
as stigmatising, until renamed and rigorously promoted by aid agencies. An independent 
evaluation found that, “There was no indication that people wanted to talk to mental health 
specialists about their problems and experiences, and some indication that they did not.”45 
Aware of local suspicion of mental health programmes, field workers have often been wary 
of using a psychosocial label in front of the recipients of their programmes fearing it may 
cause offence. For example, an UNICEF programme run by the Center for Crisis Psychology 
cautions that, “When providing psycho-social services to children, it is important at this stage 
not to label children as traumatized.”46 Similarly World Vision has been advising against the 
use of mental health terms, “Although psychosocial appears in the proposal and in the 
reports, in the field we avoid the word „psychosocial‟ […] We don‟t use the word „trauma‟ 
and try to ensure the staff don‟t.”47 Likewise Save the Children has been uncomfortable with 
the emphasis on trauma, saying how, “They do not like the word traumatised, as it means 
someone is ill.”48 Often the pill of counselling has to be coated with the sugar of other 
activities. For example, the strategy of some international agencies is to provide community, 
women‟s or youth centres as a way of establishing points of contact with locals to solicit 
them onto their counselling programmes! 
 
The population has not sought trauma counselling unprompted. International aid agencies 
have been systematically promoting the psychosocial model of trauma and therapy among the 
population. For example, CARE International in Kosovo has a Psychosocial Training and 
Support Program for Teachers “to recognize the symptoms and to address and deal with 
them.”49 Similarly the ICRC‟s work includes the dissemination of “brochures drafted for 
parents to give psychosocial support to children and youth, stress management and burn-
out.”50 Such promotion initiatives indict how the population does not identify itself 
automatically as traumatised until instructed into the Western psychosocial paradigm. 
Trauma experts sometimes even disqualify recipients from being able to make judgements 
about their own or others‟ mental health. Coping with Disaster, for example, warns about 
“the tendency of parents to misinterpret their children‟s reaction.”51 
 
Aid agencies cite the (prompted!) acceptance of their psychosocial training and services as 
vindication of the psychosocial model. However, this might be a flawed method of evaluating 
the efficacy of services. As the anthropologist Robert Hayden has observed, the desirability 
of framing requests or responses in ways understood or most favoured by administrators is an 
old lesson of practical politics. The issue of trauma is no exception. The apparent receptivity 
of the population to psychosocial programmes is related to the elevated role of international 
agencies assume in any war-affected economy and society. But the sophistication of a 
recipient population is elided in many a humanitarian encounter. Perhaps better characterised 
as a “neo-colonial mis-encounter”, a close reading of agency reports reveals how other 
factors might be operating. To cite just one aid agency report, the ICRC‟s End of Year Report 
flags up how its psycho-social programme (PSP) in Kosovo has not been rejected by the 
community, “As yet, no family has declined psychological support from the team, and in 
most situations people either ask for help or urge the PSP Team to visit another in serious 
need of psychological support or intervention.”52 The next paragraph notes that, “in several 
cases, beneficiaries have reached a point in their healing process where they then decide to 
become Red Cross volunteers. Several others have been hired for guards and cleaners at the 
Centres.” Then a little further on in the report, it is remarked that, “Several beneficiaries have 
been hired for jobs in security, housekeeping, and in a couple of cases, members of the PSP 
Counselling Teams.”53 Anybody would be naïve not to see that local receptivity to 
international aid programmes is not unconnected to possible benefits that may ensue. 
International aid agencies are far better resourced than local institutions, which in any case 
rely on over fifty percent of their funding from foreign donors. Connections with 
international agencies are obviously therefore vital to enhance access to resources and more 
lucrative employment or earning opportunities. For example, a translator working for an 
international organisation in Kosovo can typically earn 1,500 German Marks a month, five 
times what they might earn as a lecturer or teacher. To paraphrase Jane Austin, an 
international aid agency in possession of a good income must be in want of a recipient and 
this truth is well fixed in the minds of the region. It makes sense to any refugee to take up the 
offer of psychosocial counselling in circumstances where international agencies are 
systematically promoting the development of a local therapeutic profession, often recruited 
from the recipients of programmes. The international psychosocial counselling and training 
programmes are a growth industry in the region, working rather like the pyramid selling 
schemes that the Albanians so enthusiastically embraced in the late 1990s. The overall impact 
is to create a sector, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, with a vested interest in the 
Western psychosocial paradigm and the identification of trauma. Furthermore, local Albanian 
and Serbian politicians have perceptively grasped how they may usefully invoke trauma to 
advance their political objectives. As one UNHCR official astutely observed to me, “when it 
comes to politics, the trauma card is played when there is a perceived political interest, and 
kept hidden when it is not.”54  
 
Nevertheless, despite the systematic promotion of psychosocial programmes, local take-up of 
trauma counselling is far less than one would expect from agency projections of trauma. 
When interviewed, locals consistently prioritise material assistance over psychosocial 
support. Sevdije Ahmiti, who is running a women‟s centre in Pristina, argues that, “People 
here don‟t need the psycho-social counselling offered by lots of aid groups. What they need is 
jobs and homes to live in.”55 Her view is echoed in the findings of the IRC needs assessment 
report. The team found, “When you ask people what psychosocial problems they have, they 
invariably say, „Give me a roof over my head for the winter, then I will talk to you about 
psychosocial problems.‟”56 It has been practical relief, such as the food, shelter, clothes, the 
message tracing services, the provision of warm showers, that has been appreciated most by 
refugees. The British Red Cross response to the International Federation draft assessment 
observes that, “If one matches the needs expressed by refugees, host families and RC staff 
[…] with what a PS programme could provide, there is a relatively modest role for a PS 
programmes.”57 In the midst of the Kosovo aid “feast” there were still basic needs to be met. 
Many Kosovo Albanians were living in tents for a second winter and there was slowness in 
provision of aid to non-Albanian groups who fled their homes in Kosovo after June 1999. As 
the IRC survey has observed, “excessive emphasis on deficits and psychological 
dysfunctionalism will result in a failure to meet fundamental needs.”58 One British CAFOD 
aid worker working in Albania at the height of the refugee crisis told me that there were 
internationals tripping over each other demanding to do psychosocial work while refugees 
were without proper shelter.
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 Cynically the aid worker observed that the internationals‟ 
distorted priorities in the face of obvious basic material needs might be related to counselling 
being less demanding work than the hassles and labour involved in setting up camps. There 
are further factors that mean that there is not the same readiness to be involved in material 
provision. Humanitarian emergency relief has been problematised as fuelling and prolonging 
conflicts. Fear of humanitarian aid “feeding the killers” and the view that the ultimate causes 
of war are located in the mindset of the culture are two explanations for the attractiveness for 
aid agencies of psychosocial work over material relief. These concerns help explain why 
humanitarians could overlook physiological problems.  Fortunately physiological problems 
have been less acute in the Kosovo situation than is usually the experience in humanitarian 
crises. But even in Afghanistan where the population suffers from high rates of malnutrition 
and disease and one of the lowest life expectancies in the world, it has been stated by a NGO 
Healthnet International that “the greatest health problem facing the people [...] is 
psychosocial.”60 
 
The efficacy of psychosocial programmes is taken for granted by international agencies. 
However, since psychosocial approaches intrude into the most intimate aspects of 
individual‟s belief systems and interpersonal relationships, international agencies should have 
strong evidence for the efficacy of their work. The IRC team of assessors has expressed alarm 
that, “some people are being exposed to psychosocial programs that could be harmful,” 
warning that they “perpetuate a victim‟s mindset among the Kosovars generally, which is 
antithetical to healing.”61 Nevertheless, the psychosocial framework itself is not being 
interrogated. 
 
Consequently, although the few detailed studies make some very pointed criticisms about the 
nature of the psychosocial programmes in the region, often their proposals reinforce the 
therapeutic paradigm and suggest an expansion of the scope of psychosocial work. So 
criticisms of what is deplored as “excessive emphasis on individual trauma” and “an over-
medicalised model” do not denote a rejection of psychosocial work.62 Rather the call for 
social psychology as opposed to clinical psychology represents a demand for comprehensive 
psychosocial intervention, tackling personal, cultural and political values. The critical IRC 
report, for example, hails the acceptance of psychosocial concerns and calls for more 
psychiatry, psychology, nursing and social work training, accompanied by mass media 
campaigns “promoting the use of psychosocial services.”63  Such recommendations fly in the 
face of their own evidence that the population can manage without counselling.  
 
Militarised humanitarianism  
 
The continuing saliency of psychosocial intervention is connected to the related cycle of 
trauma and violence thesis and its understanding of ethnic conflict. Under the model, the 
origins of ethnic hatred are sought in the “powerful reservoir of traumatic memory.”64 
Trauma, international agencies argue, propels victims to perpetrate the violence they have 
encountered. Trauma further hinders return “to a stable and productive environment”, 
according to international trauma experts.
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 But why are wars in “far-off places” understood 
through a psychological prism? Why is ethnic conflict discussed in terms of cycles of trauma 
and violence? Can these wars not be understood in Clausewitzian terms as the continuation of 
politics?  
 
In the case of Kosovo, much is made of revenge as a motive and the retention of blood feuds 
in Albanian culture. The image of irrational ancient tribal hatreds is popular with Western 
commentators and policy-makers. International preoccupation with trauma and revenge as a 
motive ignores the impact of modernising forces on Kosovo society. Present politics, rather 
than past trauma, fuels continuing conflict. Although the Kosovo situation was understood by 
many humanitarian organisations as a human rights issue, grievances were not confined to 
human rights but concerned competing national claims to sovereignty. The conflict may be 
characterised as a Yugoslav offensive to retain sovereignty over Kosovo against a modern 
Kosovo Albanian counter-insurgency campaign in the name of human rights to secure its 
sovereignty over Kosovo.
66
 However, for the globalised profession of humanitarians, 
sovereignty and territorial disputes appear redundant motives for war. In contrast, for the 
parties, sovereign authority is far from irrelevant to their lives. Not least, political power is 
aspired to as providing immediate access to resources and escape from the hardship of 
subsistence farming in situations of underdevelopment. As an Albanian revealingly reported 
to one human rights organisation, “There are no jobs, so we have to work.”67 For Kosovo was 
far from a prosperous productive economic environment. However, premised on a belief in 
the essential harmony of interests under globalised capitalism, the contemporary therapeutic 
paradigm does not recognise contrary imperatives and therefore seeks the origins of conflict 
in the dysfunctionalism of individuals and their communities. Yet, the present irreconcilable 
solipsistic perspectives can only be reinforced by therapeutic approaches emphasising 
individual and communal psychology as the site of explanation. 
 
To question ethnopsychology as the cause of war is not to deny that animosity exists. 
Certainly individuals may find cultural and political defences against trauma in ethnic or 
racial hatred, as was the case with some British POWs in Japanese camps.
68
 The assimilation 
of traumatic experiences into a framework of ethnic divisions has been observed in Kosovo. 
Expression of hatred and desire for revenge were expressed among a high percentage of 
respondents in a survey of Kosovo Albanians conducted between August and October 1999.
69
  
These feelings of animosity were vividly witnessed by the IRC delegation team. The team 
cites meeting one community where, “A little girl about six years old, whose father had been 
murdered by Serbs, proudly recited a poem for the delegation. The poem praised Albanian 
Kosovars‟ courage and demonized Serbs as „Black bitches‟.”70 Yet, neither expression of 
ethnic animosity nor ethnic clashes should be unexpected given the unresolved contestation 
over sovereignty. It would be surprising if sentiments and relations were otherwise in 
circumstances where Kosovo‟s future political status is up for grabs. To call the post-June 
1999 situation “post-conflict” is rather a misnomer when killings continued at levels that 
belied the ostensible cessation of hostilities. Indeed international officials have declared that 
more Serbs were killed following the setting up of UNMIK than Kosovo Albanians were 
during the war.
71
 Such stark problems have led critics to accuse international policy-makers 
of “playing pollyanna as the body count rises.”72  
 
The present ethnic hostility and grievances, like normal defence responses to trauma, may be 
tempered by new expediencies, which makes inter-ethnic cooperation, as opposed to inter-
ethnic conflict, more salient. Even now, for all the thoughts of revenge,
73
 the scope of so-
called revenge attacks are largely territorially defined and influenced as much by political and 
economic considerations as hatred. While killings have taken place in Kosovo and over in the 
disputed Presevo Valley, there has been a remarkable lack of enthusiasm among the Albanian 
and Serbian communities abroad to pursue vengeance. Any incidents abroad have been 
tended to be with the host population rather than between the two refugee communities. 
 
The motif of revenge further ignores the impact of external actors in militarising the situation 
in Kosovo. Although the local use of force is pathologised as violence, humanitarian 
organisations have shown an ambiguous attitude towards the NATO military campaign 
against Yugoslavia. There were internal debates within humanitarian organisations about the 
efficacy of NATO military intervention and whether the military campaign escalated the 
conflict and precipitated the humanitarian crisis,
74
 but in practice there was a blurring of the 
role of humanitarian organisations and the military.
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 Suppressing qualms that the notion of 
humanitarian war contravened humanitarian principles, prominent humanitarian organisations 
lobbied Western governments for military intervention in Kosovo, while at the same time 
continuing to implement psychosocial programmes promoting non-violent conflict resolution. 
For example, senior figures in Oxfam and Save the Children visited the British Foreign 
Office seeking the British government to adopt a pro-military intervention stance in Kosovo. 
This blurring of humanitarian and military roles was very apparent on the ground, particularly 
for refugees with NGOs taking over the running of camps set up by military contingents of 
the same nationality.
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 It is in this context of the new norm of military humanitarianism that 
the failures of the normative non-violent conflict education programmes should be viewed. 
Given the endorsement of a militarised approach, it is unsurprising that a population should 
view the use of violence against an enemy as legitimate to achieve its political goals. As 
regional analyst Susan Woodward has noted the lessons of the last decade for the region have 
been that “violence pays if it can be tied to humanitarian rhetoric”.77  
 Equally the trauma card is one of the lessons of the last decade. That the therapeutic 
paradigm may hamper resolution as well as understanding of the conflict is evident in how 
the theme of trauma is now problematising the return and reintegration of refugees. An 
UNHCR official involved in promoting minority return has noted that continuing trauma has 
been invoked by many Kosovo Albanians as an argument against minority return. This has 
been an influential argument in the international community:  
 
internationals working here have responded, with fairly widespread sympathy 
over the past couple of years for [sic] the view that Serb return is somehow being 
forced on the population too soon - as if there is an objective model of 
(widespread) trauma that would allow for discussion of such issues in a few years 
time in a radically changed atmosphere.
78
 
 
Nevertheless, while local actors may try to play the trauma card, the therapeutic paradigm 
does not serve their interests overall for the trauma model ultimately questions their moral 
agency and capacity for self-government.  
 
Victims and perpetrators 
 
The rational character of the Kosovo conflict as the continuation of political disputes over the 
sovereignty of the territory is denied in the cycle of trauma and violence thesis. Instead the 
contemporary humanitarian approach understands the competing political actors within a 
therapeutic paradigm as victims/perpetrators of violence. The therapeutic paradigm 
effectively reduces the human subject to the idea of the vulnerable depoliticised inner child 
and its flipside of primordial violence, and is instinctively drawn to images and instances, 
which seem to affirm this dualistic model as in the example of the little girl above. The 
trauma/violence model is not only problematic as an explanation for social violence and war, 
but the approach delegitimises the recipient population as political actors. Unacknowledged is 
that these “traumatised nationalism” explanations echo the themes (if not the language) of 
earlier Western racist psychology with its notion of the pathological personality of the 
colonial subject. The earlier racist psychology acted as an apology for the denial of political 
rights. Similarly, today the elevation of trauma and the construction of individuals as 
damaged have negative implications for their right to self-determination. The Slovenian 
philosopher Slavoj Zizek has been very critical of Western humanitarianism‟s construction of 
non-Westerners: 
 
the Other to be protected is good in so far as it remains a victim (which is why we 
were bombarded with pictures of helpless Kosovar mothers, children and old 
people, telling moving stories of their suffering); the moment it no longer behaves 
like a victim, but wants to strike back on its own, it magically turns all of a 
sudden into a terrorist/fundamentalist/drug-trafficking Other.
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The people of Kosovo of all ethnicities are reduced to victims or perpetrators of violence. In 
this framework, we are witnessing the return of Rudyard Kipling‟s concept of the Whiteman’s 
Burden and the image of the non-Westerner as “half savage, half child.” Alongside the 
rehabilitation of the White Man‟s Burden, there has been the resurrection of the notion of the 
pathological state of the dependent population. Four decades ago, the Algerian psychiatrist 
Frantz Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth (1965) challenged Western racist psychology and 
its pathologisation of the non-Western mind, locating pathology in the colonial or neo-
colonial relationship itself.
80
  However, Fanon‟s humanist critique is no longer considered 
pertinent. Rather than take up Fanon‟s critique, both aid workers and local psychiatrists and 
psychologists have been willing to adopt the Western therapeutic framework.  
 
The dualistic model of the recipient population as “half savage, half child” informs initiative 
after initiative. Individuals easily slip from being cast as victim to being cast as perpetrator. 
In response to the fear that untreated trauma may have a multigenerational impact and foster 
violence,
81
 the international community has instituted numerous psychosocial rehabilitation 
programmes across the region. For example, an ECHO programme for Albanians in Skopje, 
Macedonia was set up “to improve the cooperation between children, tolerance, appeasement 
of aggressive and destructive feelings.”82 The IRC report cited above recommends that 
“Schools [...] promulgate values of tolerance and non-violent conflict resolution for all 
children, thus breaking the cycle of ethnic hatred in the next generation,” adding that, 
“Schools attract parents as well and are an additional opportunity to influence adult 
attitudes.”83 
 
International intervention is not confined to inter-ethnic relations, but is becoming involved 
in relations at all levels of society because of the notion of a continuum of violence. 
Populations are not trusted psychologically in their most intimate relationships. For example, 
the report Child Mental Health and Psychosocial Services in Kosovo contends that the 
situation has meant a rise in child abuse and domestic violence.
84
 The report echoes earlier 
claims by one of the authors that stress in former Yugoslavia was leading parents to be 
violent towards their children.
85
 Neither report presents evidence of an increase, but the belief 
arises from the deterministic cycle of trauma and violence thesis. The notion of a continuum 
of violence underlying the rationale of psychosocial programmes overlooks how individuals 
in violent situations continue to evaluate what violence they consider acceptable or 
unacceptable.  Effectively, the psychosocial model resurrects the Hobbesian spectre of war of 
all against all as the perpetuation of abuse of all against all.  Writing on the problem of social 
order, the sociologist Dennis Wrong challenges such a Hobbesian model: 
 
Societies never fall apart to the extent of literally lapsing into a war of all against 
all. Nation-states may fragment […] into several hostile groups controlling 
different localities […] But underneath these processes social order survives at 
least at a micro-sociological level – the level of families, small groups, and 
networks of interacting individuals cooperating in the pursuit of common goals.
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Indeed he argues that the mobilisation of groups for conflict requires a certain level of social 
cooperation.
87
 Even proponents of the cycle of trauma and violence have acknowledged the 
dearth of evidence demonstrating that traumatic or violent experiences lead to a breakdown 
of moral values or the acceptance of violence per se.
88
  
 
Furthermore, however well-intentioned, these psychosocial programmes are fatally flawed by 
the contradictory norms of contemporary humanitarianism. As educational psychology 
recognises, the assimilation of normative education programmes is likely to fail in the face of 
contrary imperatives, as did postwar Yugoslavia‟s own “brotherhood and unity” education 
programmes.
89
 Following Gregory Bateson‟s theorisation of schizophrenia,90 the people of 
the region are caught in a double bind imposed by the (inherent) contradictions of 
contemporary militarised humanitarianism. On one level, a primary injunction instructs the 
population not to be violent. Yet a secondary injunction contradicts the first and instructs the 
population it has a right to be violent and will be rewarded for using violence. At the same 
time, this double bind is subject to a tertiary injunction that the population shall submit to the 
violence of the international community
91
 as its use of violence is not violence. 
 
Invalidating the population 
 
That people are either victims or perpetrators of violence both in the private and public 
sphere has serious implications for the right to self-determination. Externally devised 
psychosocial programmes do not simply involve invalidating the population‟s coping 
strategies and feelings about the war, but their invalidation as political actors. By attributing 
the origins of war to deep cultural and psychological causes, the rational capacity of local 
actors is effectively denied. Today in the imperative to instil tolerance, the authoritarian 
implications of policies appropriating the right to determine conscience are ignored.
92
 In the 
denial of the political and moral capacity of the population due to the traumas and hatreds of 
war, people are being disqualified from determining their own affairs. Every sphere in 
Kosovo comes under international supervision: from military to economic, political, legal, 
educational and other social matters. The concentration of international military and civil 
staff involved in running Kosovo exceeds any previous foreign presence.  
 
MSF has warned how, “The humiliation of being controlled from outside and the dependency 
on a divided international community undermined the self-esteem of the inhabitants” in 
Bosnia.
93
 Their warning was apposite. Equally, extensive international administration has 
been experienced as de-moralising in Kosovo.  International report after report exhorts the 
need for the population to take ownership of the peace process. Warning about the danger of 
psychosocial programmes fostering a victim mentality, the IRC evaluation recommends that, 
“What the population needs instead is to be helped in regaining control and power over their 
lives and their environment.”94 However, the IRC‟s own recommendations and that of other 
humanitarian organisations represent an expansion of the external regulation of society.  All 
the empowerment, self-esteem, human rights psychosocial programmes represent a further 
double bind in which the population is caught. As Andrew Robinson suggests, a primary 
injunction disqualifies people psychologically and politically from determining their affairs 
and requires them to adopt the psychosocial model. A second injunction instructs them to 
develop independent psychologically functional personalities that take control of their 
environment. Meanwhile for all the injunctions about participation and taking ownership, a 
tertiary structural barrier denies them substantive control or escape from pathological ethnic 
categories.  
 
How does the population survive such a schizophrenic existence, in the absence of challenge 
to its precepts? Fortunately most recipients take a pragmatic approach to international 
psychosocial programmes. In their failure to internalise the psychosocial model and its 
contradictory injunctions, people have spared themselves the full impact of the external 
pathologisation of their condition. However, the therapeutic paradigm is hindering the 
possibility of reconciliation in Kosovo. While individuals may adapt their coping strategies to 
the international aid community, the pathologisation of the population only mystifies the 
causes of conflict and has become an obstacle to resolution. Significantly the trauma card is 
already being invoked as obstacles to both reconciliation and self-government. Reducing the 
causes of the war to the psychology of population neglects the internationalisation of the 
conflict and wider structural issues. A prerequisite for the regeneration of war-affected 
societies is rejection of their pathologisation. 
 
Address for correspondence: Vanessa Pupavac, School of Politics, University of 
Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK. E-mail: vanessa.pupavac@nottingham.ac.uk 
                                                     
1
 I would like to thank the Overseas Development Institute for the use of their Special Documentation Resource 
on Kosovo. In particular I thank ODI librarian Kate Kwafo-Akoto and Lucy Morrison of the Humanitarian 
Policy Group staff who were very helpful in finding documents for me. I am indebted to Andrew Robinson, 
Jane Shackman, Yannis Stavrakakis and Derek Summerfield for their insights and particular references. 
However, responsibility for the views expressed in this text is mine. 
2
 For analysis of the Anglo-American therapeutic culture, see Kirby Farrell, Post-traumatic Culture: Injury and 
Interpretation in the Nineties (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1998); Frank Furedi, 
Culture of Fear: Risk-taking and the Morality of Low Expectations (London and New York: Continuum, 2002); 
Ellen Herman, The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995); Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1978), The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984); James Nolan, 
Therapeutic State: Justifying Government at Century’s End (New York: New York University Press, 1997); 
Charles Sykes, A Nation of Victims: The Decay of American Character (New York: St Martins Press, 1992); 
Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self  (London: Routledge, 1990), Inventing Our 
Selves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
3
 See, for example, BBC News, 30 June 1999. 
4 SPANA, “Kosovo Animal Appeal”, Times, 1 July 1999, p. 53, emphasis added. 
5
 Vanessa Pupavac, “Therapeutic Governance: Psycho-social Intervention and Trauma Risk Management,”        
Disasters 25 no 4, (2001), pp. 358-372. 
6
 Derek Summerfield, “Childhood, War, Refugeedom and „Trauma‟: Three Core Questions for Mental Health 
Professionals,” Transcultural Psychiatry 37 no 3, (2000), p. 422. 
7
 Wilbur J. Scott, The Politics of Readjustment: Vietnam Veterans Since the War (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 
1993). 
8
 Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face to Face Killing in Twentieth Century Warfare (London: 
Granta Books, 2000); Benjamin Shephard, War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists 1914-1994 (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 2000). 
9
 Derek Summerfield, “The invention of post-traumatic stress disorder and the social usefulness of a psychiatric 
category,” British Medical Journal, no 322, (13 January 2001), available at http://ww.bmj.com 
10
 Oxfam, General Assessment in Kukes (Albania: Oxfam, 3-4 April, 1999a). 
11
 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (New York: Dover Publications, 1994), p. 22. 
12
 John H. Ehrenreich, Coping with Disaster: A Guidebook to Psychosocial Intervention prepared for Mental 
Health Workers without Borders (August 1999), available at http://www.mhwwb.org/contents.htm, emphasis in 
the original. 
13
 ICRC, The Balkans Evaluation: An Examination of the Role of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement’s Response to the Balkan Crisis, Lesson and Recommendations for Future Crisis Situations (London: 
ICRC, 27 March 2000), pp. 18-19. 
14
 Mark Waysman, Joseph Schwarzwald and Zahava Solomon, “Hardiness: An Examination if Its Relationship 
With Positive and Negative Long Term Changes Following Trauma,” Journal of Traumatic Stress, 14, no. 3 
(2001), pp. 531-548. 
15
 Robyn M. Dawes, House of Cards: Psychology and Psychotherapy Built on Myth (New York: The Free Press, 
1996); Tana Dineen, Manufacturing Victims: What the Psychology Industry is Doing to People (London: 
Constable, 1999). 
16
 Michael J. Scott and Stephen G. Stradling Counselling for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (London, 
Thousand Oaks, New Dehli: Sage Publications, 2001) p. 126. 
17
 S. Wessely, J. Bisson and S. Rose, “A Systematic Review of Brief Psychological Interventions („Debriefing‟) 
for the Treatment of Immediate Trauma Related Symptoms and the Prevention of Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder.” In Oakely-Browne, R. Churchill, D. Gill, M. Trivedi and S. Wessly (eds) Depression, Anxiety and 
Neurosis Module of the Cochrane Library, Issue 3, (Oxford, Update Software, 2000). 
18
 Personal communication, 14 November 2000. 
19
 Dineen, pp. 84-85; Raj Persaud, Staying Sane: How to make your mind work for you (London: MetroBooks, 
1997) p. 47. 
20
 Emergency Management Group, Community Services Guidelines for Repatriation of Special Needs Groups 
(Albania: Emergency Management Group, 1999). 
21
 Inger Agger, Theory and Practice of PsychoSocial Projects under War Conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Croatia (Zagreb: ECHO/ECTF, 1995) p.19. 
22
 Cynthia B, Eriksson, Hendrika Vande Kemp, Richard Gorsuch, Stephen Hoke and David W. Foy, “Trauma 
Exposure and PTSD Symptoms in International Relief and Development Staff,” Journal of Traumatic Stress, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
14, no. 1, (2001), pp. 205-212. 
23
 Centre for Humanitarian Psychology, Psychological Support to Humanitarian Workers in Europe and 
Humanitarian Organisations, Report on the Situation (March 1999); Ehrenreich; Scott and Stradling, pp. 126-
127.  
24
 UNICEF, Kosovo refugees face trauma and stress (Kosovo: UNICEF, 13 April 1999). 
25
 Danila Baro and Ariana Mustafa, Children involved in the Armed Conflict in Kosova (London: Save the 
Children, 11 July 1999). 
26
 UNICEF, State of The World’s Children (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
27
 IRC, IRC Kosovo Psychosocial Needs Assessment (Kosovo: IRC, 7-13 September 1999), p. 4. 
28
 Oxfam, 1999a. 
29
 Oxfam, Oxfam Health Report (Skopje, Macedonia: Oxfam, 1-9 April 1999b). 
30
 IRC, p. 4. 
31
 Peter Wiles et al, Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds. Phases I and II, 
April 1999- January 2000, Volume II  (London, ODI/VALID, 2000), p. 122. 
32
 Personal communication, Dean Shuey, 10 May 2002. 
33
 Eric Rosenthal and Eva Szeli, Not on the Agenda: Human Rights of People with Mental Health Disabilities in 
Kosovo (Washington: Mental Disability Rights International, 2002). http://www.mdri.org/ 
34
 Ibid., p. 9. 
35
 Ibid., p. 14. 
36
 Ibid., p. 6.* 
37
 Melissa Brymer and Rune Stuvland, Child Mental Health and Psychosocial Services in Kosovo (Kosovo, 
February 2000), p. 12. 
38
 Ibid., emphasis added. 
39
 CARE International, Psychosocial Training and Support Program (Kosovo: Care International, 1999), p. 5.  
40
 Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1995); Frank Furedi, "The institutionalisation of recognition - evading the moral stalemate." DMAP 
Conference, University of Cardiff 4-6 APRIL 2002.   
41
 E.T. Dean, Shook over Hell: Post-Traumatic Stress, Vietnam and Civil War (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1997); Summerfield, 2001. 
42
 Amy L. Ai, Christopher Peterson, and David Ubelhor “War-Related Trauma and Symptoms of Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder Among Adult Kosovar Refugees.” Journal of Traumatic Stress, 15, no. 2, (April 2002), pp. 157-
160. 
43
 Barbara Lopez Cardozo, Alfredo Vergara, Ferid Agani and Carol Gotway, “Mental Health, Social 
Functioning and Attitudes of Kosovar Albanians following the War in Kosovo. ” Journal of the American 
Medical Association, 284, no. 5, (2 August 2000). http://jama.ama-assn.org/issues/v284n5/rfull/joc00483.html 
44
 C. Merridale, Night of Stone: Death and Memory in Russia (London: Granta Books, 2000). See the discussion 
in Derek Summerfield, “The Effects of War: Moral Knowledge, Revenge, Reconciliation and „Recovery‟,” 
British Medical Journal, forthcoming. 
45
 Wiles et al, 2000, p. 122. 
46
 UNICEF, Center for Crisis Psychology (Kosovo: UNICEF, 1999). 
47
 Wiles et al, 2000, p. 115. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 Care International, 1999, p. 1. 
50
 ICRC, Joint International Red Cross Delegation in Albania, Fact Sheet, Assistance to Kosovar Refugees 
(Albania: ICRC, 26 March-25 June 1999). 
51
 Ehrenreich. 
52
 ICRC, 1999, p. 2 
53
 Ibid., p. 4. 
54
 Guy Edmonds, UNHCR, personal communication 10 September 2002. 
55
 Cited in James Hilder, “Post-war Kosovo women must work to overcome conflict trauma,” (27 November 
1999), available at http://www.reliefweb  
56
 IRC, p. 4. 
57
 British Red Cross, Response to the Int Fed Draft Assessment of April 99 (London: British Red Cross, 1999).  
58
 IRC, p. 6. 
59
 Personal communication, 1 February 2001. 
60
 WHO, “The Invisible Wounds: The Mental Health Crisis in Afghanistan,” WHO Special Report, Central Asia 
Crisis Unit, Emergency and Humanitarian Action Department, Geneva, 6 November 2001.  
61
 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
62
 Ibid., p. 6. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
63
 Ibid., p. 6. 
64
 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Psycho-Social Projects in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Caucasus: Final Evaluation Report (Oslo: Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
March 1999), p. 18. 
65
 Cardozo et al, 2000, p. 1. 
66
 Susan Woodward, “Humanitarian War: A New Consensus?” Disasters, 25, no. 4 (2001), p. 334. 
67
 Personal communication from John Laughland of the British Helsinki Human Rights Group, March 2002.  
68
 Shepherd, p. 319. 
69
 Cardozo et al, 2000. 
70
 IRC, p. 6. 
71
 John Cerone, presentation to The United Nations and Human Rights Protection in Post-Conflict Situations 
Conference, Human Rights Law Centre, University of Nottingham, 12 September 2002. 
72
 David Rieff, “On the wishful thinking of eminent persons: the Independent Commision's Kosovo Report, 
Journal of Human Rights, ” 1, no. 1 (March 2002), p. 114. 
73
 Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, A Mental Health Assessment in Kosovo, International Emergenct 
and Refugee Health Branch (New York: CDC, 1999). My thanks to Derek Summerfield for this reference. See 
discussion in Summerfield, forthcoming. 
74
 Wiles et al, p. xvi.  
73
 MSF, Evaluation Report: MSF Response in Macedonia to the Kosovo Refugee Crisis: A New Humanitarian 
Order? Evaluation Series No. 12 (London: MSF, December 1999); MSF, “Memorandum from Medecins Sans 
Frontieres,” in International Development Committee, House of Commons, Kosovo: The Humanitarian Crisis 
(London: House of Commons, 1999), Appendix 10, pp. 51-52; Mineer, L, T. Van Baarda, and M. Sommers, 
NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis, Occasional Paper #36 (2000), pp. 66; A. Suhrke, M. 
Barutciski, P. Sandison and R. Garlock, The Kosovo Refugee Crisis – An Independent Evaluation of UNHCR’s 
Emergency Preparedness and Response (UNHCR, 2000). 
76
 T. Porter, The Partiality of Humanitarian Assistance – Kosovo in Comparative Perspective, 2000, cited in 
Wiles et al, p. 79. 
77
 Woodward, p. 334. 
78
 Edmunds. 
79
 Slavoj Zizek, The Fragile Absolute or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? (London and New 
York: Verso, 2000), p. 60. 
80
 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: MacGibbon & Gee, 1965). 
81
 Agger, p. 14. 
82
 ECHO, Psycho-Social Project: Building Confidence (Skopje: ECHO, 2000). 
83
 IRC, p. 9. 
84
 Brymer and Stuvland. 
85
 UNICEF, I dream of Peace, Background Information Material (New York: UNICEF, 1993). 
86
 Dennis Wrong, The Problem of Order: What Unites and Divides Societies (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 
p. 243. 
87
 Ibid., p. 209. 
88
 G. Goodwin-Gill and I. Cohn, Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflicts (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1994). 
89
 Vanessa Pupavac, “The Limitations of SFR Yugoslavia‟s Multi-Ethnic Education Policies,” South Slav 
Journal 22, Summer (2001), pp. 33-43. 
90
 Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972). 
91
 The concept of international community effectively refers to the Western powers and their governmental or 
non-governmental allies. “The very phrase „the world community‟”, Samuel Huntington observes, “has become 
the euphemistic collective noun (replacing “the free world”) to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the 
interests of the United States and other Western powers”. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” 
Foreign Affairs, 72 (1993), p. 39. 
92
 Thomas Paine, Rights of Man (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), p. 107. 
93
 Kaz de Jong, Nathan Ford and Rolf Kleber, “Mental health care for refugees from Kosovo: the experience of 
Medecins San Frontieres, ” The Lancet, 353, Issue 9164 (8 May 1999), p. 1616. 
94
 IRC, p. 6. 
